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HOBBY LOBBY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE:
HOW THE SUPREME COURT OPENED
THE DOOR FOR SOCIALLY
CONSCIOUS INVESTORS
Professor Michele Benedetto Neitz*
“[T]o the shareholder who is concerned about social questions,
his stock ownership is not entirely a dollar symbol.”1
ABSTRACT
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,2 the Supreme Court upended the tradi-
tional foundations of corporate law. By allowing corporations to exercise
legally recognized religious rights,3 the Court changed the very nature of a
corporate entity. Moreover, the Court defied the conventional doctrine pro-
viding that the purpose of a corporation is to make profit for its sharehold-
ers.4 The case is being both praised and denounced by observers,5 but no
one has yet fully analyzed how the Court’s reasoning paved the way for
social impact investors to use the corporate form as a vehicle to achieve
their objectives.
This Article is the first to connect the Hobby Lobby case to shareholder
activism for social justice causes. The Article considers the existing meth-
ods by which advocates can use shareholder activism to create meaningful
social change. The Article next examines how the Court’s expansion of the
rights of corporate “persons” in Hobby Lobby created new legal argu-
ments for corporate social responsibility advocates. For example, after
Hobby Lobby, corporations can be considered moral “persons” who do
not need to consider shareholder wealth maximization as the highest prior-
ity.6 This reasoning presents an exciting opportunity for investors trying to
influence corporations to act in socially or environmentally beneficial
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. The author is grateful to
Professor Eric Christiansen, Professor Eleanor Lumsden, and Professor William Gallagher
for their feedback on earlier drafts, as well as research assistants Kristen Head and Casey
Crittenden. This article is dedicated to Ella Neitz.
1. Donald E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Context: Reflections on Campaign
GM, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 421, 476 (1971).
2. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
3. See id. at 2771.
4. See id. at 2770.
5. See Binyamin Applebaum, What the Hobby Lobby Ruling Means for America,
N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/7Y27/magazine/what-the-hobb-
lobby-ruling-means-for-america.html.
6. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770-71.
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ways. Accordingly, the Article will propose two ways social investors can
act now to take advantage of Hobby Lobby’s extraordinary impact on cor-
porate law doctrines: (1) creating an innovative classification of stock to
expand the voting rights of socially conscious investors, and (2) shifting
investments away from benefit corporations to larger and more influential
companies. In the wake of Hobby Lobby, this Article forecasts the emer-
gence of a new legal chapter in corporate social responsibility: Corpora-
tions as tools for generosity, not greed.
I. INTRODUCTION
SISTER Patricia Daly is an unusual shareholder. She is not a passiveinvestor who chooses a 401(k) plan and then allows others to moni-tor the performance of companies in her plan. Nor is she a wealthy
active investor, advising boards of directors about corporate governance
issues and earning millions for her own profit.
Sister Patricia Daly, a Catholic nun, is an active socially conscious in-
vestor.7 She is the Executive Director of the Tri-State Coalition for Re-
sponsible Investment, an alliance of Roman Catholic institutional
investors, and a member of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsi-
bility.8 Sister Daly and her religious order own shares through their re-
tirement funds, enabling them to attend corporate shareholder meetings
and use their voting power to “hold corporations accountable” on social
and environmental issues.9  These faith-based investors are often at the
negotiating table with the directors and officers of some of America’s
largest companies.10 When negotiation fails, Sister Daly and her col-
leagues use the shareholder proposal process to put their issues to a vote
of all of the company’s shareholders.11
Sister Daly prefers to think of herself as an “engaged” shareholder,
rather than an activist.12 But she is only one of a rising number of socially
conscious investors using their shareholder power to create social change
through corporations.13 The U.S. Supreme Court’s groundbreaking 2014
opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, in which the Court held that the
7. See Board and Staff, TRI-STATE COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, http://
www.tricri.org/about-us/board-and-staff (last visited July 11, 2014).
8. Id.
9. About Us, TRI-STATE COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, http://www
.tricri.org/about-us (last visited July 11, 2014).
10. For example, Sister Patricia Daly has negotiated with executives from Ford, Exxon
Mobil, and Archer Daniels Midland. Sister Patricia Daly, Exec. Dir., Tri-State Coalition for
Responsible Investment in San Francisco, Cal. (July 7, 2014) (hereinafter “Daly Inter-
view”); see also Dashka Slater, Resolved: Public Corporations Shall Take Us Seriously,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/magazine/
12exxon-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Kristen Hannum, Sister Patricia Battles The Board:
How Women Religious Are Protecting Consumers, 76 U.S. CATHOLIC 12, 18-22 (Dec.
2011), http://www.uscatholic.org/culture/social-justice/2011/10/sister-pat-battles-board.
11. See Slater, supra note 10.
12. Daly Interview, supra note 10, at 1.
13. See Hannum, supra note 10.
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Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate violated corporations’ re-
ligious beliefs, may have made Sister Daly’s job much easier.14
This Article has two general goals. First, the Article will consider the
methods by which social justice activists, including Sister Daly, can use
the corporate form as a vehicle to achieve their objectives. Second, the
Article will analyze how the Court’s expansion of the rights of corporate
“persons” in Hobby Lobby has created new legal arguments for corpo-
rate social responsibility advocates. Although the Hobby Lobby decision
will have significant ramifications in a variety of legal areas, including
religious freedom and reproductive rights, the analysis of this Article will
focus on the decision’s extraordinary effects on corporate law.
Part II considers the traditional view of the purpose of a corporation:
To make profit for its shareholders. This “shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion” view has been subject to some debate, but it was generally held as
the prevailing corporate law doctrine until the Hobby Lobby decision.15
As a result, active shareholders seeking to create social change through
corporations have historically been obliged to explain how their recom-
mendations will increase corporate profitability.
Part III will examine shareholder activism, including the history of this
distinctive form of shareholder involvement. This section will explain how
the shareholder proposal mechanism operates to give a voice to share-
holder activists seeking corporate change, and will also address the barri-
ers preventing average citizens from becoming shareholder activists.
Part IV reveals how the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision
changed the legal landscape for social impact investors and activists. The
Hobby Lobby majority opinion introduced uncertainty into the realm of
corporate law, changing norms that were once unquestioned. Specifically,
the Court redefined the legal view of a corporate “person” by holding
that corporations can have legally recognized religious beliefs.16 The
Court also weakened the shareholder wealth maximization model and
left open several unsettled questions, including the applicability of the
case to publicly traded corporations.17
Although Justice Alito’s opinion in Hobby Lobby purports to be a nar-
row holding focused on religious rights under a particular statute, the
case can be seen as a critical piece of the Court’s broader expansion of
corporate rights.18 In fact, the Court’s analysis leads to a logical—but rev-
olutionary—conclusion: if corporations are “persons” with beliefs under
Hobby Lobby, and at least some corporations may have morals derived
14. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
15. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768; Duane Windsor, Shareholder Wealth Max-
imization, in FINANCE ETHICS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 437 (John R.
Boatright ed. 2010).
16. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
17. See id. at 2785.
18. See generally, Citizens United vs. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see
also Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629,
1630 (2012).
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from strongly held personal convictions that do not take the traditional
and recognized form of religion, then a corporation should be able to
express beliefs that are not rooted in organized religion. In fact, a corpo-
rate “person” may be an atheist, whose shareholders do not believe in a
specific unified religion but hold strong moral beliefs related to social
justice. In this way, a corporation may embrace social justice or commu-
nity responsibility as its most prioritized “belief” and conduct its opera-
tions accordingly.
Hence, the Hobby Lobby case could permit a corporation to pursue
social justice causes in association with its beliefs at the expense of prof-
its. The reasoning in the Hobby Lobby decision has far-reaching implica-
tions for active socially conscious investors, who should take advantage of
the Court’s willingness to redefine settled corporate law doctrine.
Part V will propose two ways for shareholders to do so. First, this sec-
tion will introduce an innovative “Social Investor” classification of stock.
The Social Investor class of stock would have the same economic rights
and most of the same voting rights as common shares, but would hold two
votes for every share in the area of social impact shareholder proposals.
These shares would improve the access and influence of socially con-
scious investors, while providing a straightforward way for corporations
to include the perspectives of these investors. Second, this section will
recommend that social investors shift away from benefit corporations to-
ward investments in larger and more influential companies.
II. THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION
The modern view is that the purpose of a corporation is to make profit
for its shareholders.19 This perspective is grounded in the 1919 case
Dodge v. Ford Motor Company, in which the Supreme Court of Michigan
directed Henry Ford to distribute a large surplus to shareholders as divi-
dends.20 Ford sought to use the surplus to increase production and lower
the price of cars, and he famously declared that his ambition was “to em-
ploy still more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the
greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their
homes.”21 The court ordered Ford to issue a dividend instead, noting, “A
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders.”22
By the end of the 20th century, most scholars, business leaders, and
regulators had accepted this “shareholder wealth maximization” or
“shareholder primacy” model.23 However, an interesting debate over the
19. See The Purpose of the Corporation, The Aspen Institute, http://www.aspeninsti-
tute.org/policy-work/business-society/purpose-of-corporation (last visited Nov.10, 2014.
20. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 685 (Mich. 1919).
21. See Id. at 671.
22. Id. at 684.
23. See LYNN STOUT THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLD-
ERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 21 (2012). This theory is
also known as the “property model” or “contract model” of the corporation. See Aaron A.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SMU\68-1\SMU105.txt unknown Seq: 5 22-APR-15 8:52
2015] Hobby Lobby and Social Justice 247
true purpose of a corporation has been brewing for some time, with some
scholars arguing that a corporation could consider the welfare of other
stakeholders, including employees and customers.24  These opponents of
the shareholder wealth maximization model reason that corporations in
most states can be incorporated for “any lawful purpose,” and no corpo-
rate state statute requires a corporation to maximize shareholder profit.25
Internal corporate bylaws also do not address the matter.26 Even the lan-
guage related to corporate purpose in Dodge v. Ford Motor Company
was dicta and not binding precedent.27
Despite this ongoing debate among academics, the shareholder wealth
maximization issue was deemed settled in Delaware, the undeniable
leader in corporate law.28 This subject came before the Delaware Court
of Chancery in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark.29  In 2004, the
company eBay purchased 28.4% of the stock in craigslist, an online classi-
fied ad service.30 The two other shareholders were the founders of craig-
slist.31 eBay desired craigslist to monetize the company’s website, while
the craigslist founders “largely operate[d] its business as a community
service.”32 eBay began to utilize nonpublic information from craigslist to
support the development of a competing company.33 When the dispute
reached a boiling point, the founders tried to convince eBay to sell its
shares.34 When that failed, the founders created a staggered board, a
poison pill, and a right of first refusal to limit eBay’s influence as a minor-
ity shareholder.35
The dispute landed in the Delaware courts in 2008, when eBay filed
Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle for
Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 369-
70 (2006).
24. See STOUT supra note 23, at 28 (providing strong arguments refuting the tradi-
tional shareholder primacy model). This theory is also known as the “social entity” model.
See Dhir, supra note 23, at 369-374. For a thorough summary of the shareholder wealth
maximization debate, see J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise,
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (2012).
25. See STOUT supra note 23, at 28; Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corpo-
rate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 432 (2013).
Indeed, some states specifically allow corporate directors to consider “alternative constitu-
ents” besides shareholders. See Iowa Code Ann. § 491.101B (West 1999); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 23-1-35-1 (West 2011).
26. See STOUT supra note 23, at 28.
27. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Johnson,
supra note 25, at 432 n.203 (2013) (Dodge stated this premise “in dictum and without reci-
tation of authority. . ..”); David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 181, 188 (2014) (Dodge has never been cited in Delaware courts on the issue of
corporate purpose, and the case “is not a great doctrinal citation.”).
28. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
INCLUDING PARTNERSHIP AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, 142 (11th ed. 2010).
29. See generally, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch.
2010).
30. See id.at 11. The company name “craigslist” is not capitalized. See id. at 6.
31. See id. at 11.
32. See id. at 8-9.
33. Id. at 17.
34. See id. at 19-20.
35. See id. at 20, 23-24.
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suit to challenge the founders’ attempts to limit eBay’s power.36 eBay
argued that the founders, as directors, breached fiduciary duties to eBay,
a minority shareholder.37 The case went to trial in December 2009. The
Delaware Court of Chancery upheld the staggered board plan, but or-
dered rescission of the poison pill and the right of first refusal.38
The Delaware Court of Chancery determined that the poison pill was
not adopted in response to a reasonably perceived threat.39 More impor-
tantly for purposes of this Article, the court also held the founders had
“failed to prove at trial that they acted in the good faith pursuit of a
proper corporate purpose” in creating the poison pill.40 The court de-
clared that the corporate form is not the “appropriate vehicle for purely
philanthropic ends” because shareholders can expect to receive invest-
ment returns.41 Thus, the court held that “a corporate policy that specifi-
cally, clearly and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of
a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders” was
invalid.42
Since Delaware is the most influential state in the field of corporate
law, the eBay case can be interpreted as the codification of the share-
holder wealth maximization theory.43 In fact, this traditional view of cor-
porate purpose has limited corporations and their owners from investing
time, effort, or resources into any activity that would not ultimately im-
prove long-term shareholder profit. Investors and activists seeking to en-
courage corporations to embrace social justice issues have long been
constrained by this wealth maximization argument.44 But the Supreme
Court’s repudiation of this view in Hobby Lobby, discussed in Part IV
below, arrives at the same time that shareholders are increasingly harnes-
sing their power to influence corporations to act in socially responsible
ways.
III. THE RISE OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
A. WHO ARE SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISTS?
“Shareholder activism” is a term describing the attempt by sharehold-
ers to use the voting power of their shares to influence the behavior of
36. See id. at 25.
37. Id. at 7.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 32.
40. Id. at 34.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 224
(2014) (eBay is a case “where Delaware does enforce the shareholder primacy obliga-
tion”). For expanded discussion of eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark and its analy-
sis of shareholder wealth maximization, see Johnson, supra note 25, at 439-50.
44. See infra Part III (C).
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corporate managers.45 Shareholders can use their voting powers to advo-
cate for changes related to corporate governance and management, as
well as social or political change causes.46 In contrast to the stereotypical
passive shareholder who invests in companies and then takes a laissez-
faire approach, trusting corporate directors and officers to run the busi-
ness, active shareholders monitor, negotiate, and sometimes engage in
all-out proxy battles to create corporate change.47 While increased share-
holder engagement can be a headache for corporate management, some
studies have found that shareholder activism can improve corporate per-
formance and enhance shareholder value.48
Two brothers formed the first shareholder activist group in the U.S. in
the 1930s.49 In an annual meeting of Consolidated Gas in 1932, the board
chairman failed to acknowledge shareholders who raised their hands.50
Apparently “appalled” by management’s unwillingness to communicate
with shareholders, Lewis Gilbert and his brother John used investor activ-
ism to impact corporate governance issues.51 Their focus included pro-
moting management accountability, limiting executive compensation, and
creating more discussion between management and shareholders at an-
nual meetings.52 The brothers also urged corporations to engage in social
objectives, including “charity, good labor relations,” and “racial and gen-
der equality,” for both long-term economic and social responsibility
reasons.53
Nearly fifteen years later, in 1948, a member of the Congress for Racial
Equality named James Peck bought one share of stock in Greyhound.54
Mr. Peck used his stock ownership to attend an annual shareholders
meeting and raise the issue of integrated bus seating in the American
South.55 Although this “first militant social issue shareholder activist”
was unsuccessful in persuading Greyhound management to integrate
buses, Mr. Peck made the argument that segregation was an economic
issue for the company.56
45. James R. Copland et al., Proxy Monitor 2012: A Report on Corporate Governance
and Shareholder Activism, PROXY MONITOR (Fall 2012), http://www.proxymonitor.org/
forms/pmr_04.aspx.
46. See id.
47. See id.; LISA M. FAIRFAX SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHARE-
HOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION, 39 (2011).
48. See FAIRFAX, supra note at 47; see also Copland, et al. supra note 45.
49. Anastasia O’Rourke, A New Politics of Engagement: Shareholder Activism for
Corporate Social Responsibility, BUSINESS STRATEGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 11 (July 11,
2003), https://gin.confex.com/gin/archives/2002/papers/010243ORourke.pdf.
50. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the
United States, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK n.9 (2007), 7 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=959670.
51. Id.
52. O’Rourke, supra note 49, at 11.
53. JAY EISENHOFER & MICHAEL BARRY, THE HISTORY OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIV-
ISM, 3-4 (Supp. 2007).
54. Id. 3-5.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Richard Marens, Inventing Corporate Governance: The Mid-Century
Emergence of Shareholder Activism, 8(4) J. BUS. & MGMT. 371, 371 (2002)).
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Shareholder activism flourished as a vehicle for social justice protests
in the 1960s and 1970s. Shareholders challenged companies on civil rights
employment issues (Eastman Kodak); anti-Vietnam war protests (Dow
Chemical for the production of napalm); and weapons production (Hon-
eywell).57 Ralph Nader, in conjunction with the “Project on Corporate
Responsibility,” used shareholder proxy votes in the 1970s to pressure
General Motors on social responsibility issues, including consumer safety
and environmental and employment discrimination.58
The landscape of shareholder activism has changed significantly in the
modern era with the rise of institutional investors.59  The percentage of
stock owned by institutional investors in the United States rose from
7.2% in 1950 to 61.2% of outstanding securities in 2005.60 These organi-
zations, including pension funds, mutual funds, and labor unions, have
become much more prominent and active shareholders.61
Institutional investors tend to hold large portions of stock for longer
periods of time than individuals.62 As a result, when institutional inves-
tors are unhappy with corporate performance, they are incentivized to try
to change companies from within rather than exercise the “Wall Street
Rule” and sell their stock.63 These organizations also have more expertise
and resources for activism than an ordinary investor.64
Some investors are more active than others. Hedge funds, which are
investment vehicles using “a variety of techniques to ‘hedge’ against fluc-
tuations in the market,”65 have succeeded in numerous high profile ac-
tivist campaigns recently.66  Faith-based investors, such as Sister Patricia
Daly and the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, are active in
environmental, anti-military, and human rights issues.67 Socially Respon-
sible Investment (“SRI”) funds, which screen investee companies based
on environmental or social performance, are creating and supporting
shareholder proposals on these issues.68 In addition, proxy advisory firms
offer services to shareholders including vote recommendations and actual
57. O’Rourke, supra note 49, at 12.
58. Id.
59. An “institutional investor” professionally manages money on behalf of someone
else. EISENHOFER & BARRY supra note 53, at 3-6.
60. Id. at 3-7; see also FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 47 (institutional investors owned
73% of stock at the 1,000 largest U.S. companies in 2009).
61. EISENHOFER & BARRY, supra note 53, at 3-6.
62. Id. at 3-7 – 3-8.
63. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 30-31.
64. Id. at 47.
65. Hedge funds are “notoriously difficult to define.” Goldstein v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 451 F.3d 873, 874-75 (D.C. Cir 2006). Common characteristics of hedge funds
include “(a) increased risks/returns to investors; (b) high management fees, and (c) lack of
regulatory oversight.” EISENHOFER & BARRY, supra note 53, at 3-76; see also FAIRFAX,
supra note 47, at 46.
66. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 53-56 (noting “hedge funds have experienced success or
partial success in nearly two-thirds of their campaigns”).
67. O’Rourke, supra note 49, at 12.
68. Id. at 7. In 2010, 12% of all professionally managed assets were under the manage-
ment of SRIs. See also STOUT, supra note 23, at 98.
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voting of proxy cards.69 While not technically shareholders, these firms
are quite influential on shareholder voting and can significantly shape the
outcomes of activist campaigns.70
The rise of institutional investors translates into a smaller percentage of
stock being held by individuals. Individuals owned approximately 90% of
stock in 1950.71 By 2009, individuals owned only 36% of shares in the
U.S.72 A small number of individuals involved in shareholder activism
(whether through their own holdings or as leaders of institutions) have
become Wall Street celebrities, including Warren Buffet, Carl Icahn, and
T. Boone Pickens.73
Notably missing from most discussions of shareholder activism are av-
erage individual investors. This is partly due to the complicated legal
mechanism for shareholder action.74 Some individual activists are work-
ing to empower other individual shareholders to become more active. For
example, Carl Icahn established United Shareholders of America to en-
courage individual investors to join corporate governance campaigns.75
Cost is also a concern. Even individuals who own large blocks of shares
may be unable to pay for a shareholder activist campaign.76 Since activists
“incur all the costs associated with such activism (while the benefits ac-
crue to all shareholders), only shareholders with large positions are likely
to obtain a large enough return on their investment to justify the costs.”77
The fiscal playing field for stock ownership and shareholder activism
should be leveled in order to allow the concerns of ordinary investors to
be heard by corporate leaders.
B. GOALS OF TRADITIONAL SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISTS
Shareholder activists have a broad array of objectives for their activ-
ism. Long-term shareholders, such as pension funds or mutual funds, are
focused on “steady, long-run returns” on their investments.78 As a result,
most institutional investors focus on corporate governance issues, includ-
ing removal of management-friendly devices such as poison pills, classi-
fied boards, and anti-takeover provisions.79
Short-term investors, such as hedge fund activists, also seek gains re-
lated to corporate governance, including replacing management by win-
ning seats on boards of directors, forcing buyouts or sales of part or all of
a company, or enacting dividends or share repurchases to boost cash dis-
69. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 60.
70. Id. at 61.
71. See id. at 46.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 58-59.
74. See infra Part III(D).
75. Id. at 59.
76. See Gillian & Starks, supra note 35, at 35.
77. Id.
78. STOUT, supra note 23, at 66.
79. Gillan & Starks, supra note 35, at 15.
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tributions to shareholders.80  In the 2000s, as corporate scandals rocked
shareholder faith in boards of directors, shareholder activists increased
attention on executive compensation and board independence.81
C. GOALS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACTIVISTS
Socially conscious investors have a different focus for their activism:
encouraging companies to be more “socially and environmentally respon-
sible.”82 These investors intend to spark discussion about human rights,
global warming, employment discrimination and labor practices, tobacco,
and other policy issues.83 For example, in 2005, investors in publicly
traded corporations filed thirty resolutions related to global warming.84
Some companies, such as ChevronTexaco, Ford Motor Company, and
Unocal, responded in a friendly manner, engaging activists in negotiation
and agreeing to improve disclosures and actions related to climate
change.85 Others, such as ExxonMobil, unsuccessfully sought permission
from the SEC to exclude proposals asking the company to reduce emis-
sions linked to global warming.86 Ultimately, the ExxonMobil climate
change resolutions won only 30% support from shareholders.87 Although
the precatory shareholder proposals did not earn majority shareholder
support, environmental activists succeeded in putting ExxonMobil on the
defensive and bringing undesirable publicity to the company’s energy
practices.88
Religious investment groups were early and energetic socially minded
shareholder activists. These investors often create coalitions with SRIs
and other social justice organizations to support social policy proposals.89
For example, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility
(“ICCR”) referenced in the Introduction has been a leader in the corpo-
rate social responsibility movement for over thirty years.90 The ICCR “is
a coalition of faith and values-driven organizations who view the manage-
ment of their investments as a powerful catalyst for social change.”91
Through a combination of dialogue and the use of shareholder proposals,
the ICCR and its members, including Sister Patricia Daly’s Tri-State Coa-
lition for Responsible Investment, are focused on creating corporate ac-
tion related to social and environmental issues.92
80. Id. at 30; see also EISENHOFER & BARRY, supra note 53, at 3-85.
81. Gillian & Starks, supra note 35, at 15, tbl. 1 at 43.
82. EISENHOFER & BARRY, supra note 53, at 3-12 (citing Homepage, INTERFAITH
CENTER ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, http://www.iccr.org/ (last visited July 21, 2014)).
83. Id. at 3-12, 3-13.
84. Id. at 3-18.
85. Id. at 3-19.
86. Id. at 3-19, 3-20.
87. Id. at 3-20.
88. See id.
89. Dhir, supra note 23, at 384-85.
90. EISENHOFER & BARRY supra note 53, at 3-12.
91. About ICCR, INTERFAITH CENTER ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, http://www
.iccr.org/about-iccr (last visited July 20, 2014).
92. See id.
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Although research suggests that the “vast majority” of people would be
willing to make sacrifices, including shareholder profits, in order to follow
their conscience,93  shareholder activists historically have had to contend
with the shareholder wealth maximization theory. Many social activism
campaigns are designed to benefit both society and the long-term finan-
cial interests of the company’s shareholders. For example, the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association—College Retirement Equities Fund
(“TIAA—CREF”), one of the world’s largest and most active institu-
tional investors, acts in accordance with its belief that “a record of social
responsibility may enhance a company’s reputation and its long-term eco-
nomic performance.”94 One TIAA-CREF official clarified, “Some of the
issues people would call social issues have long-range implications for the
company’s profits. If a company has poor policies on labor or diversity
and it leads to fines, it changes from a social issue to a financial issue in a
hurry.”95
In the wake of the Hobby Lobby decision abrogating the shareholder
wealth maximization theory, shareholder activists with social justice
objectives may be freed from being forced to explain how their sugges-
tions would increase shareholder profit. Furthermore, social justice advo-
cates who have not traditionally seen corporations as vehicles for social
reform stand to benefit from learning the process for shareholder activ-
ism. As more people become shareholder activists, and as activists gain
more leverage with corporate boards, corporations could increasingly be-
come positive actors in social change movements.
D. MECHANISM FOR SHAREHOLDER ACTION:
THE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL
Shareholder activists cannot simply walk into a CEO’s office and de-
mand reform. Instead, shareholders who wish to influence corporate
management primarily use the shareholder proposal process to advocate
for change.96
Shareholder proposals are recommendations for corporate action
drafted by shareholders.97 The proposals are included with the corporate
proxy statement (at the company’s expense) and submitted to all share-
93. STOUT, supra note 23, at 97.
94. EISENHOFER & BARRY, supra note 53, at 3-12.
95. Id. (citing David Nicklaus, Mutual Fund Ballots Are No Longer Secret with New








visited July 21, 2014).
96. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 64.
97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2014).
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holders for a vote at a shareholder meeting.98 This mechanism is a “po-
tentially important part of corporate democracy,” since it gives an
individual shareholder with a relatively small number of shares the ability
to raise issues with her fellow shareholders “through the corporation’s
proxy statement.”99 As the SEC explained in a Legal Bulletin, this pro-
cess is “popular because it provides an avenue for communication be-
tween shareholders and companies, as well as among shareholders
themselves.”100
The shareholder proposal mechanism as we know it today began in
1942, with the SEC’s adoption of a rule mandating disclosure of share-
holder proposals.101  This rule, requiring companies to include share-
holder resolutions in proxy statements mailed to shareholders at the
company’s expense, was intended to enable shareholders to gather sup-
port for their resolutions without incurring large costs.102 The SEC de-
manded that resolutions were “of concern to all shareholders” and
related to the “ordinary conduct of business.”103 The process has devel-
oped over time, and SEC Rule 14a-8 now governs the shareholder propo-
sal mechanism.104
The SEC drafted Rule 14a-8 in a question and answer format to make
the process more accessible to individual shareholders.105 Corporate
management may exclude a shareholder proposal from the corporate
proxy statement for procedural or substantive reasons.106 If a corporation
succeeds in excluding a proposal, the shareholder must decide whether to
mount a proxy campaign on her own—a costly and often ineffective
proposition.107
Procedurally, in order to submit a proposal, a shareholder must hold at
least $2,000 in market value or 1% of the company’s stock for at least one
year.108 This requirement ensures that “only shareholders with long-term
interest in the corporation” are allowed to present proposals to their fel-
low shareholders.109 However, this threshold also prevents middle-in-
come investors and social justice advocates from accessing the
98. Id.
99. HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 621. The Obama administration attempted to
mandate proxy access for shareholders of all public corporations in 2010 through the SEC’s
adoption of Rule 14a-11, granting shareholders access to the corporate proxy statement to
nominate director candidates. See Bus. Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1144, 1152 (D.C. Cir.
2011) However, the D.C. Circuit court struck down the rule. See id.
100. EISENHOFER, supra note 53, at 3-9 (citing SEC Division of Corporate Finance, Staff
Legal Bulletin No. 14 (July 13, 2001), available at www.sec.gov/interps/legal.)
101. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 65.
102. O’Rourke, supra note 49, at 12.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 65.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2014).
109. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 65.
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shareholder proposal process.110 Some corporate advocates are pressur-
ing the SEC to raise the threshold ownership amount for shareholder
proposals to $20,000.111 This would effectively preclude most individual
shareholders from accessing the shareholder proposal mechanism.
A shareholder may only submit one proposal per shareholder’s meet-
ing.112 The proposal itself cannot exceed 500 words,113 and the company
must receive it no less than 120 days before the date the company re-
leased the prior year’s proxy statement to shareholders.114 The share-
holder or her representative must personally appear at the shareholder
meeting to present the proposal for a shareholder vote.115
If an eligible shareholder and her proposal pass the procedural hurdles,
the proposal must still overcome the substantive bases for exclusion from
the proxy statement.116 Rule 14a-8 identifies thirteen reasons a company
may exclude a proposal.117 These restrictions represent the SEC’s “prag-
matic effort” to limit the amount of shareholder proposals and ensure the
proxy statement is only used for issues of “general importance to
shareholders.”118
E. THE SUBMISSION OF SOCIAL POLICY PROPOSALS
Proposals related to corporate social responsibility are most commonly
excluded from proxy statements via two particular exclusions: (7) man-
agement functions (“if a proposal deals with a matter relating to the com-
pany’s ordinary business operations”), and (10) substantially
implemented (“if the company has already substantially implemented the
110. The national average wage index for 2012 was $44,321.67. National Average Wage
Index, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/AWI.html (last
visited July 21, 2014).
111. Daly Interview, supra note 10. The SEC Commissioner recommended raising the
threshold to “$200,000, or even better, $2 million,” before suggesting dropping the flat
dollar test entirely in favor of a percentage test. Daniel M. Gallagher, Remarks at the 26th
Annual Corporate Law Institute, Tulane University Law School: Federal Preemption of
State Corporate Governance (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/
Speech/1370541315952#.U9qMLlYwjwJ. The ICCR and other shareholder groups wrote
letters in opposition. Email from Mary Beth Gallagher, Associate Director, Tri-State Coa-
lition for Responsible Investment, (July 7, 2014) (on file with author).
112. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c).
113. Id. at § 240.14a-8(d).
114. Id. at § 240.14a-8(e)(2).
115. Id. at § 240.14a-8 (h)(1); see also id. at § 240.14a-8(h)(3) (permitting the corpora-
tion to exclude all of that shareholder’s proposals from its proxy materials for any meetings
held in the following two calendar years for failure of the soliciting shareholder to appear
and present the proposal, without good cause).
116. Id. at § 240.14a-8(i) (1)-(13).
117. Id. These reasons are: (1) Improper Under State Law; (2) Violation of Law; (3)
Violation of proxy rules; (4) Personal grievance; special interest; (5) Relevance; (6) Ab-
sence of Power/Authority; (7) Management functions; (8) Relates to election; (9) Conflicts
with company’s proposal; (10) Substantially implemented; (11) Duplication; (12) Resub-
missions; (13) Specific Amount of Dividends.
118. HAMILTON ET AL. supra note 28, at 622 (citing Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to
Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L REV. 1129, 1143-48 (1993) (discussing
whether there is a federal or state law foundation for Rule 14a-8’s bases for exclusion).
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proposal.”)119 Shareholder activists, recognizing this, craft the actual
wording of proposals carefully to avoid exclusion.120 For example, share-
holder proposals are often non-binding recommendations or requests in-
stead of demands, and are drafted to relate only to future corporate
conduct.121
Moreover, “the SEC’s interpretation of these rules for exclusion are . . .
shifting,” and topics once excluded from proxy statements may ultimately
be permitted.122 This is the case for proposals related to executive com-
pensation; once considered “mundane” and excluded as related to man-
agement functions, these proposals are now “fair game for
resolutions.”123
If a corporation wishes to exclude a proposal for procedural or substan-
tive reasons, the burden is on the corporation to prove that exclusion
from the proxy statement is valid.124 A corporation seeking to exclude a
proposal from its proxy statement must notify the SEC and the submit-
ting shareholder no later than eighty days before the filing of the proxy
statement.125 The corporation may choose to make a no action request,
asking the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance staff to not recommend
that the SEC take enforcement action against the company for excluding
a proposal.126 A so-called “no action letter” assures a corporation “that it
can exclude a shareholder proposal without repercussions.”127 No action
letters are publicly available to serve as guidance for both shareholders
and corporations.128
Historically, the SEC allowed proposals related to social responsibility
issues to be excluded by corporations.129 The SEC announced in a 1945
release that the shareholder proposal rule was not designed to “permit
stockholders to obtain the consensus of other stockholders with respect
to matters that are of a general political, social or economic nature.”130
The shareholder proposal mechanism became more friendly for social
policy proposals in 1976, when the SEC narrowed the ordinary business
exclusion to encompass only proposals that “involve business matters that
are mundane in nature and do not involve any substantial policy or other
119. O’Rourke, supra note 49, at 19.
120. Id.
121. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 71; see also HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 630.
122. O’Rourke, supra note 49, at 19.
123. Id. Beginning in 2004, executive compensation has been the “number one issue
addressed by shareholder proposals.” FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 78. Under the Dodd-
Frank Act’s “say on pay” provision, shareholders in public companies will regularly vote
on executive compensation. Id. at 79.
124. 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8(g) (2014); see also FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 65.
125. 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8(j) (1).
126. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 68.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 621.
130. H. Rodgin Cohen & Glen T. Schleyer, Shareholder vs. Director Control Over So-
cial Policy Matters: Conflicting Trends in Corporate Governance, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 81, 117 (2012).
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considerations.”131 With this change, the SEC essentially sanctioned
shareholder proposals related to policy or economic implications.132
Predictably, the SEC struggled to determine on a case-by-case basis
what constituted a “substantial policy consideration” allowing exclu-
sion.133 During this time, the SEC mandated inclusion of numerous pro-
posals related to corporate equal opportunity or affirmative action
policies.134 In 1992, the SEC changed its position to create an exception
for proposals related to employment matters.135 Cracker Barrel share-
holders brought a proposal requiring the company to establish a policy of
non-discrimination against homosexuals.136 In a no action letter issued in
response to Cracker Barrel’s request to exclude the proposal, the SEC
determined that “the fact that a shareholder proposal concerning a com-
pany’s employment policies and practices for the general workforce is
tied to a social issue” was no longer a reason to require inclusion of the
proposal on a corporate proxy statement.137 These proposals would in-
stead be deemed excludable as related to ordinary business operations.138
The controversy surrounding the Cracker Barrel no-action letter was
significant and resulted in litigation on the part of shareholder advocates,
questioning the SEC’s authority to issue such a change, and corporations
seeking to broaden the exclusion.139 In 1996, the U.S. Congress became
involved, directing the SEC to study shareholder proposals relating to
social policy.140 The pressure led the SEC to reverse its position in 1998,
returning to its pre-Cracker Barrel interpretation allowing a case-by-case
analysis for social policy proposals.141 This approach, which remains in
place today, has been criticized for increasing the workload of the SEC
and promoting unpredictability for shareholders and corporations.142
In recent years, the SEC has made it tougher for companies to exclude
social policy proposals from corporate proxy statements.143  Before 2009,
the SEC permitted exclusion of social policy proposals “if the focus of the
proposals was on the company’s internal assessment and management of
the risks and liabilities presented by the issue, rather than the broader
social effects of the company’s operations.”144  In a 2009 Staff Legal Bul-
131. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 41 Fed.
Reg. 52994, 52998 (Dec. 3, 1976); see also Cohen & Schleyer, supra note 130, at 119.
132. See Cohen & Schleyer, supra note 130, at 119.
133. See id., at 119-120.
134. HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 624.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1992-1993
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,418 (Oct. 13, 1992) [hereinafter Cracker
Barrel No-Action Letter]; see also HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 624; Cohen &
Schleyer, supra note 130, at 119-20 (discussing the Cracker Barrel case).
138. Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 137.
139. Cohen & Schleyer, supra note 130, at 120.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 121.
142. Id. at 122.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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letin, the SEC announced that it would not permit exclusion of social
policy proposals “if the risk at issue arises from a significant policy mat-
ter,” whether or not the proposal concentrates on “the risk to the com-
pany or the broader social impact.”145
Since then, the SEC has maintained its inclusionary approach to social
policy proposals.146 For example, in 2011, the SEC allowed a proposal
focused on climate change, despite the fact that the proposal did not ad-
dress the impact of the company’s operations on climate change.147 The
SEC’s broader view of social policy proposals led some corporate attor-
neys to lament that shareholders may now be “permitted to use issuer
proxy statements as a forum for general social policy discussions.”148
However, in the best-case scenario, this development can be viewed posi-
tively as creating dialogue among powerful corporate executives about
difficult subjects, eventually resulting in corporate changes and creating
benefits for society at large.149
F. THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL POLICY PROPOSALS
If shareholder proposals are now legally appropriate venues for corpo-
rate social responsibility debates, the tide has shifted for shareholder ac-
tivism and social justice. Social policy shareholder proposals are an
increasingly important part of corporate democracy; between 2006 and
2012, 38% of shareholder proposals submitted to Fortune 200 companies
were related to social policy—the same percentage as those related to
corporate governance.150 For Fortune 100 companies, social policy issues
were the topic of 51% of shareholder proposals in 2011.151 The most com-
mon topic for social policy proposals was environmental sustainability,
followed by corporate political participation, animal rights, employment
issues, and other human rights.152 Sister Patricia Daly reports that the Tri-
State Coalition for Responsible Investment has a 98% success rate when
its shareholder proposals are reviewed by the SEC.153
Support for social policy proposals is growing among shareholders. His-
torically, social policy proposals rarely received support of more than
20% of shareholder votes. However, the shareholder approval for these
proposals is now up to 30% or higher.154 As a comparison, in 2008 only
145. Id. (discussing SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E, 2009 WL 4363205 (Oct. 27,
2009)).
146. Id. at 123-24.
147. Id. at 123.
148. Id. at 123-24.
149. For an example of this “best-case scenario,” see discussion of ICCR’s negotiation
with Archer Daniels Midland, infra Part III(F).
150. Copland et al., supra note 45.
151. Cohen & Schleyer, supra note 130, at 123-24 (citing Manhattan Institute Proxy
Monitor Finding 7, 2011 Proxy Season Review, Database Reveals Decline in Successful
Shareholder Proposals, PROXY MONITOR (2011), http:// www.proxymonitor.org/Forms/
Finding7.aspx.
152. Copland et al., supra note 45.
153. Daly Interview, supra note 10.
154. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 82.
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7% of social policy proposals received 30% shareholder support.155 In
2011, 14% of social policy proposals were approved by 30% of sharehold-
ers.156 A 2011 Chevron shareholder resolution calling for a report on
“fracking” was supported by 40.5% of shareholders’ votes.157 The statis-
tics show “an increasing possibility that social policy proposals will be
approved by a majority of votes cast.”158
Some may argue that less-than-majority support for precatory share-
holder proposals lacks any power or meaning. After all, boards of direc-
tors are not required to accede to shareholder requests through the
proposal mechanism; directors can simply ignore a shareholder’s non-
binding proposal.
This argument fails to recognize the escalating impact of the share-
holder proposal process. A social policy proposal garnering 20% to 30%
of shareholder support is actually a red flag to directors demonstrating
that it is time to engage in a dialogue with shareholders about that partic-
ular topic.159 In effect, “[e]ven non-binding proposals can significantly in-
fluence the direction of a company, as management and boards that
ignore shareholders are much more likely to face negative recommenda-
tions from the proxy advisory services and stronger opposition from
shareholders at the next meeting.”160
In addition, shareholder activists can measure success by the number of
proposals that are withdrawn, since withdrawn proposals are an indica-
tion that corporate directors are addressing shareholder concerns without
the need for a formal vote.161  For example, the ICCR recently engaged
with Archer Daniels Midland (“ADM”).162 The shareholders brought a
shareholder resolution requesting a “comprehensive sustainable agricul-
ture policy,” including environmental and human rights protection. 163
The company responded by negotiating with the shareholder group to
develop and adopt a “Respect For Human Rights Statement,” including
“policies for fair wages, safe working conditions, freedom of association,
and ethical recruitment standards that expressly prohibit workers paying
recruitment fees.”164 In light of the company’s response, the shareholders
155. See New Database Reveals Shareholder Proposal Trends, PROXY MONITOR (Win-
ter 2011), http://proxymonitor.org/forms/Reparts.aspx.
156. Cohen & Schleyer, supra note 130, at 123-24 (citing New Database Reveals Share-
holder Proposal Trends, PROXY MONITOR (Winter 2011), http://proxymonitor.org/forms/
Reports.aspx.
157. Hannum, supra note 10, at 18-22.
158. Cohen & Schleyer, supra note 130, at 125.
159. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 82.
160. Shulte, Roth & Zabel, LLP, Shareholder Activism Insight 9 (2012), http://www.srz
.com/files/News/7cd7d880-c430-4c04-bb31-f12637ae313e/Presentation/NewsAttachment/
3c06638e-5702-4720-a1b6-f4bdd41a46ef/SRZ_2012_Shareholder_Activism_Insight.pdf.
161. FAIRFAX, supra note 47, at 82.
162. Press Release, Interfaith Center On Corporate Responsibility, Shareholders Com-
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withdrew their resolution and viewed this case as a success.165
Hence, the rising power of shareholder activists, coupled with the Su-
preme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision empowering shareholders as ex-
plained below, present an exciting opportunity for social justice advocates
who are interested in corporate social responsibility. If these advocates
are able to invest in publicly traded companies and subsequently create
social policy shareholder proposals, there is growing potential that corpo-
rate directors would need to listen and act. The corresponding publicity
may inspire other activists (and other corporations) to do the same. As
more investors become engaged in activism, “[t]he broadening out of the
types of investors involved in shareholder activism has significant implica-
tions for corporate policy. . . [because] companies must take notice when
investor groups that have been less active previously become vocal with
their views and dissatisfaction.”166 The next section will explain how the
Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision expanded the legal arguments
available to social investors.
IV. HOW THE HOBBY LOBBY DECISION SUPPORTS
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACTIVISTS
A. THE BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY OPINION
The plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby were the owners of three closely held
corporations, Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood Specialties, and Mardel.
The owners believed in accordance with their religious faith that life be-
gins at conception.167 Accordingly, the owners argued that it would vio-
late their Christian beliefs and right to freedom of religion to comply with
aspects of the Affordable Care Act, which requires employers to provide
health care coverage, including contraception, to employees.168
The owners of Conestoga, the Hahn family, are devout Mennonites.169
They sued the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and
other federal agencies to enjoin application of the contraceptive mandate
to their corporations under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (“RFRA”) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.170 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania court denied a preliminary
injunction.171 The Third Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that “for-
profit, secular corporations cannot engage in religious exercise” under
the RFRA and First Amendment,172 and the mandate does not impose
any personal requirements on the corporate owners.173
165. Id.; Daly Interview, supra note 10. The ICCR must have “some type of a commit-
ment” from a company before it will withdraw a shareholder proposal. Id.
166. Shulte et al., supra note 160, at 9.
167. Id. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2755 (2014).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2764.
170. Id. at 2765.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 389.
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The Green family members are Christians who own Hobby Lobby and
Mardel.174 Hobby Lobby is a nationwide chain, with more than 13,000
employees and 500 stores.175 Mardel is a Christian bookstore with nearly
400 employees and 35 stores.176 They also sued under RFRA and the
Free Exercise Clause to enjoin application of the contraceptive mandate
to their businesses, and the Western District of Oklahoma court denied a
preliminary injunction.177 Unlike the Third Circuit, however, the Tenth
Circuit held that the Hobby Lobby and Mardel were “persons” as defined
under RFRA, and therefore had a viable claim.178 Analyzing this claim,
the Tenth Circuit held that the corporations had established a likelihood
of success under RFRA because “the contraceptive mandate substan-
tially burdened the exercise of religion.”179 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit
held that HHS had failed to prove that the mandate was the “least restric-
tive means” of furthering a government interest.180 Finding that the cor-
porations had “demonstrated irreparable harm,” the Tenth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case to the district court.181 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in 2013.182
In a divided five to four opinion, the Supreme Court accepted the cor-
porate owners’ argument that their for-profit corporation should be con-
sidered a “person” under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.183
RFRA was enacted in 1993 to provide “very broad protection for relig-
ious liberty.”184 The Court decided that the HHS regulations violated
RFRA, holding that a closely held corporation could claim a religious
exemption to the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act.185
Significantly, the Hobby Lobby Court held for the first time that a for-
profit corporation could have legally recognized religious beliefs.186
The Hobby Lobby opinion was a landmark decision for corporate law
in several ways. First, as every law student learns in an introductory Busi-
ness Associations class, corporations differ from partnerships because









182. Id. at 2767.
183. Id. at 2768-69.
184. Id. at 2755. RFRA was originally designed to apply to both the federal Govern-
ment and the states. When the Supreme Court struck down the application of RFRA to
the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-34 (1997), Congress responded by
passing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”).
RLUIPA defined “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not com-
pelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S. C. §2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012).
185. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
186. See id. Justice Ginsberg noted in dissent that “until today, religious exemptions
had never been extended” to commercial entities. Id. at 2795 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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tors, officers, and shareholders.187 In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court
undermined this separate entity theory by defining a corporation as “sim-
ply a form of organization used by humans to achieve desired ends.”188
Indeed, the Court focused on the persons behind the entity rather than
the entity itself, noting that corporations are unable to do anything with-
out the people who “own, run and are employed by them.”189
The Court’s opinion in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission
foreshadowed this result.190 In Citizens United, a conservative lobbying
corporation wanted to distribute a documentary about Hillary Clinton
within thirty days of the 2008 primary election.191 The Court held the
corporation’s political financial expenditures were a form of protected
free speech under the First Amendment of the Constitution.192 Notably
for this Article, the Citizens United Court described corporations as “as-
sociations of individuals” for purposes of First Amendment rights.193
In addition to altering the view of a corporation as a separate entity,
the Hobby Lobby court strikingly rejected the shareholder wealth max-
imization perspective.194 The Court maintained that the argument that
corporations exist solely to make money “flies in the face of modern cor-
porate law.”195 The Court recognized that corporations could be created
for “any lawful purpose” under state corporate law, and noted that “mod-
ern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue
profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.”196 The
Court noted favorably that “[f]or-profit corporations, with ownership ap-
proval, support a wide variety of charitable causes.”197 The Court illus-
trated this proposition with examples of environmentally responsible
activities and fair labor conditions, stating that just as these “worthy
objectives” may be pursued by corporations at the expense of profits, re-
ligious objectives may be pursued as well.198 The Court’s reasoning un-
dermined decades of corporate focus on profits and shareholder wealth,
providing a unique opportunity for corporate social responsibility activ-
ists and investors.199
187. HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 3.
188. Id. at 2768.
189. Id. at.
190. Citizens United vs. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
191. Id. at 321.
192. Id. at 393.
193. Id.
194. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770-71.
195. Id. at 2770.
196. Id. at 2771 (emphasis omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See Kent Greenfield, Hobby Lobby Symposium: Hobby Lobby, “unconstitutional
conditions,” and corporate law mistakes, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2014, 9:07 AM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-symposium-hobby-lobby-unconstitutional-con-
ditions-and-corporate-law-mistakes/.
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B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HOBBY LOBBY FOR SOCIAL INVESTORS
Hobby Lobby reframed critical aspects of American corporate law. By
allowing corporations to exercise religious liberty, the Supreme Court has
enabled investors to argue that corporations must also be able to priori-
tize social responsibility. The most relevant portions of the Hobby Lobby
case for this Article relate to the corporate entity theory, shareholder
wealth maximization, and the opinion’s implications for publicly traded
corporations.
1. Hobby Lobby’s Impact on the Corporate Entity Theory
The Hobby Lobby Court essentially broke down the wall between
shareholders and a corporation.200 No longer a separate entity, a corpora-
tion may now be viewed as a “nexus of humans.”201 This reasoning repre-
sents a startling departure from the established norms underpinning
corporate law. In fact, the separation of investors from the corporate en-
tity is traditionally a major reason for incorporation.202 Before the Hobby
Lobby decision, this separation worked as a two-way street: the fact that
shareholders could not be identified with the company meant their opin-
ions and beliefs were separate from the entity itself, but in turn share-
holders could not be liable for corporate debts.203
The Hobby Lobby case blurred this line. According to the Court, pro-
tecting the rights of corporations is actually protecting the rights of per-
sons within the business: “When rights, whether constitutional or
statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the
rights” of the people affiliated with the corporation: shareholders, of-
ficers, and employees.204
By eliminating the separation between a corporate entity and its own-
ers, the Hobby Lobby Court has “changed, definitionally, what it means
to be a corporation.”205 Corporate law experts are still debating how this
new approach to corporate entity doctrine will play out in the courts.206
But it is clear that this shift will have major repercussions on future cor-
porate law decisions. For example, the Court’s reasoning conflicts with
the logic underlying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil. If a corpo-
ration is an association of persons whose beliefs are carried out by the
corporation, there is no “veil” between corporate creditors and share-
200. Id.
201. Usha Rodrigues, The Supreme Court’s View of the Corporation in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 2, 2014), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2014/
07/the-supreme-courts-view-of-the-corporation-in-burwell-v-hobby-lobby.html.
202. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of Pe-
titioners at 4, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-
356), 2014 WL 333889, at *4.
203. Id. at *14.
204. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
205. Greenfield, supra note 199.
206. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Symposium, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 19, 2014), http://
www.theconglomerate.org/hobby-lobby/.
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holders.207 As Justice Ginsberg pointed out in her dissenting opinion in
Hobby Lobby, “[o]ne might ask why the separation should hold only
when it serves the interest of those who control the corporation.”208
This decisive change in how a corporation is viewed also empowers
shareholders, who now have more influence in directing corporate poli-
cies. Rather than separating their personal interests from the purpose of a
corporate entity, shareholders can now use the corporate form to claim
their own rights and accomplish their personal objectives. Indeed, that is
exactly what the Hahn and Green families successfully accomplished in
this case.
The Hobby Lobby Court’s analysis was admittedly intended to be nar-
rowly applied to corporate owners’ religious beliefs under RFRA.209
However, the Court’s analysis is framed in a way that will inevitably lead
to an expansion of its holding.210 Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion asserted that our constitutional tradition includes the right “to
establish one’s religious (or nonreligious) self-definition in the political,
civic, and economic life of our larger community.”211 Read broadly, Jus-
tice Kennedy’s inclusion of “nonreligious” identity suggests that the non-
religious beliefs of a corporation—which really means those of its
owners—are also constitutionally important.
Thus, although the Court’s analysis was grounded in RFRA, the Court
offers no rationale to prevent the expansion of its reasoning to encompass
moral beliefs. For example, the Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga
shareholders were members of organized religions.212 But what about a
corporate “atheist”—a corporation whose shareholders do not believe in
God but hold strong moral beliefs that they should (for example) give
207. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of Pe-
titioners supra note 202, at *7-8.
208. Hobby Lobby 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). A group of corporate
law professors submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in connection with the
Hobby Lobby case explaining this dilemma. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and
Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitioners supra note 202, at 13-14. The brief was
apparently not persuasive to the Court. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779-80.
209. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782.
210. For example, soon after the decision corporations sought Hobby Lobby-style relig-
ious exemptions related to LGBT employment discrimination, far beyond the realm of
health care. Molly Ball, Hobby Lobby Is Already Creating New Religious Demands on
Obama, THE ATLANTIC, (July 28, 2014), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2014/07/hobby-lobby-is-already-creating-new-religious-demands-on-obama/
373853/. In addition, in September 2014, a federal judge cited Burwell v. Hobby Lobby to
support a ruling that a member of a Fundamentalist Mormon sect was not required to
testify in a child labor investigation. Perez v. Paragon Contractors, No. 2:13CV 00281-DS
2014 WL 4628572, at *4 (D. Utah Sept. 11, 2014). The District Court held that forcing such
testimony would place a substantial burden on the Mormon sect member’s religious be-
liefs. See id. Dean Irwin Chemerinsky noted that this is “just the start of cases of people
claiming religious exemptions from general laws” in the wake of the Hobby Lobby deci-
sion. Shadee Ashtari, Judge Cites Hobby Lobby to Excuse Fundamentalist Mormon from
Child Labor Testimony, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2014/09/18/hobby-lobby-testimony-mormon-child-labor_n_5844696.html/.
211. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
212. Id. at 2755.
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more than 50% of the corporation’s profits to charity instead of distribut-
ing such profit as dividends?  Certainly some nonreligious shareholders
hold strong moral convictions related to social justice. Even shareholders
belonging to different religions may agree on some aspects of morality.
What would happen if shareholders used their corporation to perform an
action they deem to be “moral,” such as a socially beneficial act or pro-
gram, that conflicted with the corporation’s pursuit of profit?
2. The Expanding Purpose of a Corporation After Hobby Lobby
The answer lies in the Court’s newly expanded definition of corporate
purpose. Unlike the traditional view of corporate purpose expecting cor-
porations to prioritize shareholder wealth over all else, the Supreme
Court declared in Hobby Lobby that a corporation’s purpose can be
closely aligned with the rights and interests—profit or otherwise—of its
shareholders.213
The Supreme Court’s apparent repudiation of the shareholder wealth
maximization theory has significant implications for corporate social re-
sponsibility activists. Traditionally, corporations have implemented so-
cially or environmentally beneficial activities with the understanding that,
in addition to the benefits conferred on the community by such programs,
long-term profit maximization can also result from these actions.214 For
example, the world’s largest tobacco company, Philip Morris, has donated
millions of dollars over several decades to support charities and the
arts.215 In 2001, the company donated $115 million to charity, including
gifts to the “favorite philanthropies” of legislators.216  The company then
spent $150 million on advertisements extolling its charitable donations for
public relations purposes.217 Philip Morris’s charitable gifts were clearly
designed to improve the company’s image and increase profitability.
But Hobby Lobby raises the intriguing notion that courts may accept
corporate social responsibility programs in alignment with shareholders’
morality that do not provide even long-term financial advantages to the
corporation and its shareholders. After all, the Court noted that the
closely held Hobby Lobby corporation closes on Sundays to comply with
the owners’ religious beliefs, even though this action causes the owners to
lose millions of dollars in sales per year.218 In this way, the Hobby Lobby
reasoning may be viewed as endorsing actions that do not maximize
shareholder profit. This endorsement might signal the dawn of a new age
for corporate social responsibility, as corporations may have moral beliefs
outweighing their interests in profit. If profit no longer needs to be the
213. Id. at 2768.
214. Norm Orstein, Corporations: Still Not People, THE ATLANTIC (July 3, 2014), http://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/07/corporations-still-not-people/373889/.




218. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766 (2014).
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first concern of corporate managers, corporations now have room to per-
form a vast array of socially or environmentally beneficial actions.
c. Hobby Lobby’s Applicability to Publicly Traded Companies
Should the Court’s analysis differ for publicly traded companies? Per-
haps not. Although Justice Alito’s majority opinion sought to narrowly
apply the holding in Hobby Lobby to closely held corporations, the Court
did not define the term “closely held corporation.”219 There are several
available definitions.
One approach would be to consider state corporate statutes for clarifi-
cation. As Professor Stephen Bainbridge explained shortly after the deci-
sion, courts will likely look to the law of the state of incorporation to
determine whether a corporation is closely held, and states have different
definitions for this term.220  However, courts could also take a federal
definition into account; the Internal Revenue Service defines a “closely
held corporation” as one with “more than 50% of the value of its out-
standing stock owned (directly or indirectly) by five or fewer individuals
at any time during the last half of the tax year; and is not a personal
service corporation.”221  Thus, a corporation could be publicly traded
with the majority of its stock held by a few individuals. “S” corporations,
which may not have more than 100 shareholders, would also qualify as
“closely held.”222 For instance, Hobby Lobby is an “S” corporation with a
small number of shareholders but thousands of employees.223 As Justice
Ginsberg noted in the Hobby Lobby dissent, “‘[c]losely held’ is not sy-
nonymous with ‘small.’”224
The Court’s failure to define the term “closely held” is especially nota-
ble because the Court did not specifically state that its reasoning would
219. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
220. Stephen Bainbridge, What is a “close corporation” for purposes of the new Hobby
Lobby rule, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (July 1, 2014), http://www.professorbainbridge
.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/07/what-is-a-close-corporation-for-purposes-of-the-
new-hobby-lobby-rule.html. The typical statute defines a closely held corporation as having
no more than thirty-five shareholders. The IRS requires that no more than five sharehold-
ers may own 50% of a closely held corporation’s shares. See 26 U.S.C. § 542 (2012).
221. Help & Resources, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Help-&-Resources/Tools-&-FAQs/
FAQs-for-Individuals/Frequently-Asked-Tax-Questions-&-Answers/Small-Business,-Self-
Employed,-Other-Business/Entities/Entities-5 (last visited July 15, 2014).  In August 2014,
the federal government solicited public comments about the definition of a closely held
corporation as part of its proposed regulations related to the ACA—a telling sign that the
definition is not clear-cut. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Afforda-
ble Care Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 51092 (proposed Aug. 27, 2014) available at https://www.feder-
alregister.gov/articles/2014/08/27/2014-20254/coverage-of-certain-preventive-services-
under-the-affordable-care-act#h-10.
222. Drew Desilver, What is a “Closely Held Corporation” Anyway, and How Many
Are There?, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (July 7, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2014/07/07/what-is-a-closely-held-corporation-anyway-and-how-many-are-there/.
223. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014); see also
Desilver, supra note 222.
224. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2797 n.19 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
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not apply to publicly traded companies.225 Instead, the Court’s majority
opinion stated that would be “unlikely” that publicly traded corporations
would assert religious beliefs under RFRA, since it is “improbable” that
unrelated shareholders, including institutional investors, “would agree to
run a corporation under the same religious beliefs.”226 Justice Ginsberg
noted in dissent that the Court’s “logic extends to corporations of any
size, publicly or private.”227
Thus, the Hobby Lobby decision would not preclude a publicly traded
company from seeking the same type of religious exemption benefits con-
ferred on the Hobby Lobby corporation. It would only require a control-
ling shareholder (or a block of shareholders pooling their votes to
constitute a majority) choosing to determine the religious beliefs of the
corporation. For example, under the IRS definition, Wal-Mart is a closely
held but publicly traded company, with the majority of its stock owned by
the Walton family.228 As Professor Kent Greenfield explained, if the Wal-
ton family agreed that its religious beliefs dictated that LGBT employees
should not be hired by Wal-Mart, “nothing in the logic of the [Hobby
Lobby] opinion would limit the company’s ability to claim a Hobby
Lobby waiver” from state laws preventing employment discrimination
against LGBT employees.229
How would this relate to corporate social or environmental responsibil-
ity? Read together, the holdings of Citizens United and Hobby Lobby
could be expanded to include corporate social responsibility initiatives in
publicly traded companies. Under Citizens United, corporations may con-
stitutionally hold political beliefs in alignment with their shareholders’ in-
terests.230 Under Hobby Lobby, corporations may hold the same
religious beliefs as their shareholders.231 Why then, can’t corporations
also hold the social justice beliefs and morality of their shareholders? In-
deed, if a corporation is simply an “association of individuals” under Citi-
zens United,232 and the rights conferred on a corporation are simply
designed to “protect the rights of these people” under Hobby Lobby,233
then the people behind the corporate entity should be legally allowed to
choose the corporation’s priorities (political, religious, or otherwise). This
would include “worthy objectives,”234 such as the craigslist founders’ de-
225. Id. at 2774 (“we have no occasion in these cases to consider RFRA’s applicability
to [publicly traded] companies.”)
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2797 (Ginsberg, J. dissenting); see also id. at  2797 n.19 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)
228. Jay Hancock, Court Ruling Geared to ‘Closely Held’ Firms, but What is That?,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 30, 2014), http://www.Kaiserhealthnews.org/news/companies-
workers-hobby-lobby-decision/.
229. Greenfield, supra note 199. Professor Greenfield’s prediction proved to be correct.
See Ball, supra note 210.
230. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370-71 (2010).
231. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. ct. 2751, 2770-71 (2014).
232. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 at 392.
233. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
234. Id. at 2771.
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sire to operate their business as a “community service,”235 that do not
enhance shareholder wealth.
At first glance, the idea that publicly traded shareholders would agree
to support corporate social responsibility initiatives without long-term
corporate profit might appear naı̈ve or disingenuous. But recent exam-
ples demonstrate that corporations are increasingly choosing to do “the
right thing” despite the resulting negative or neutral effect on profitabil-
ity. For example, the largest pharmacy chain in the United States, CVS,
voluntarily stopped selling all tobacco products in its stores in 2014 in an
effort to create a store environment supportive of public health.236 The
move will cost CVS an expected $2 billion in revenue.237 Some fast-food
chains, such as In-N-Out Burger and Shake Shack, pay their workers well
above the minimum wage.238 While the founders of these companies
hope the higher wage will reduce employee turnover, they decided to pay
these wages “partly because they wanted to do the right thing.”239
Remarkably, corporate directors, officers, and shareholders desiring to
“do the right thing” now have a legal basis to create socially responsible
programs benefiting stakeholders other than shareholders. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby opens the door for shareholder activists
to advocate for socially beneficial programs, regardless of those pro-
grams’ impacts on shareholder profit maximization. Shareholders are in
the driver’s seat, and their personal beliefs can dictate corporate policy.
Accordingly, more socially conscious investors may become activists, ar-
guing that their corporations should adopt their views and enact socially
or environmentally beneficial programs.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Hobby Lobby created a new era for social investors and corporate so-
cial responsibility advocates. Although the long-term consequences of the
case have yet to be realized, shareholder activists can use the reasoning of
the case to increase their power as owners of corporations. This section
will suggest two ways social investors can act now to take advantage of
Hobby Lobby’s extraordinary impact on corporate law doctrines: creat-
ing a new classification of stock to expand the voting rights of socially
conscious investors, and shifting investments away from benefit corpora-
tions to larger and more influential companies.
235. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 8 (Del. Ch. 2010).
236. Matthew Herper, Kicking the Habit: CVS to Stop Selling Tobacco, Sacrificing $2




238. Steven Greenhouse & Stephanie Strom, Paying Employees to Stay, Not Go, N.Y.
TIMES (July, 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/business/economy/boloco-and-
shake-shack-offer-above-average-pay.html?_r=0.
239. Id.
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A. NEW “SOCIAL INVESTOR” CLASSIFICATION OF STOCK
The Model Business Corporation Act (“MBCA”) offers great flexibil-
ity to incorporators devising stock classifications. A corporation’s articles
of incorporation may authorize shares with special, conditional, or limited
voting rights, or no voting rights.240 Distributions, including dividends,
may be calculated in any manner.241 Terms of shares may vary,242 and the
Act takes care to note that its description of possible “preferences, rights,
and limitations of classes or series of shares” is not an exhaustive list.243
The MBCA is the model for most corporate state statutes, and its trend
toward a flexible stock structure mirrors the modern trend of flexibility
throughout modern corporate law.244 Corporations and their lawyers can
design the stock structure that works best for that company’s needs, as
long as the classes of stock are properly described in the articles of incor-
poration.245 Thus, corporations could legally create a new class of stock
designed to enhance the company’s dialogue about socially conscious
issues.
To accomplish this goal, corporations could create “Social Investor
shares” (“SI shares”). These shares would hold equivalent economic
rights to distributions as other classifications of stock. However, they
would retain two votes for every share on the particular issue of social
impact shareholder proposals.
This stock differs from dual-class structures found in some publicly
traded companies, such as Google and Facebook, in which the founders
of the company retain control through a separate class of super-voting
stock.246  Here, Social Investor shareholders only hold “super-voting”
shares in the narrow area of nonbinding shareholder proposals. They do
not have more control in the company than other shares, since they can-
not influence director elections or any traditional governance issues other
than socially conscious shareholder proposals. To alleviate concerns
about the dilutive impact of a new classification of stock on the rights of
existing shareholders, the creation of Social Investor shares could be lim-
ited to the incorporation or reincorporation stage of a company’s life
cycle.
This new classification of stock has numerous advantages. For the aver-
age investor who cares about social justice issues, SI shares offer a chance
240. Model Bus. Corp. Act. § 6.01(c)(1) (2006).
241. Id. at § 6.01(c)(3).
242. Id. at § 6.01(e).
243. Id. at § 6.01(f).
244. This trend is most notably visible with the extraordinary popularity of Limited
Liability Companies (LLC), a type of unincorporated entity emphasizing flexibility in
structure and governance.
245. Id. at § 6.01(f).
246. Dual-class structures are rising in popularity as founders of companies desire to
retain control after the company’s Initial Public Offering of shares. For example, when
Facebook went public, its founder Mark Zuckerberg owned 18% of the company but con-
trolled 57% of the stock. James Surowiecki, Unequal Shares, THE NEW YORKER (May 28,
2012), http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2012/05/28/120528ta_talk_surowiecki.
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to gain ownership into corporations and influence corporate decisions re-
lated to social responsibility. For other shareholders, SI shares represent
a chance to open shareholder proposals to a wider variety of shareholder
audiences.
Corporations adopting SI classifications of stock would also benefit.
First, this classification would encourage additional investment on the
part of impact investors who wish to invest in socially conscious corpora-
tions. Socially conscious investors seeking to invest in corporations would
likely gravitate to companies with this type of stock. In addition, corpora-
tions with SI stock classifications would immediately achieve a public re-
lations advantage. Much like CVS and the fast-food chains referenced
above, these corporations would be applauded for “doing the right
thing.”247 In this way, the existence of SI shares might also help to quell
public anger toward corporations.
There are disadvantages to the creation of a Social Investor classifica-
tion of stock. Presumably, social investor shares with expanded voting
rights would cost more than common shares of stock, which would limit
this stock to those who can afford the investment. SI shares could also be
used in a negative way, with opponents of social responsibility programs
using these shares to vote heavily against socially conscious shareholder
proposals.
One point likely to be raised by corporate managers is the fact that SI
shares give a larger megaphone and audience to shareholder activists. Al-
though the existence of these shares may benefit the corporation in the
long run by expanding the investment pool to attract more impact inves-
tors, it is true that corporate directors would have to deal with a more
engaged shareholder group. Whether this is an advantage or disadvantage
depends on one’s perspective. Either way, with both economic rights and
voting power, SI shareholders would be real investors with a stake in the
corporation, not outsiders seeking only publicity.
The purpose of this section is to simply introduce the concept of Social
Investor shares, but this new idea raises a host of questions for considera-
tion in future articles. For example, the term “socially conscious share-
holder proposal” would need to be carefully defined in a corporation’s
articles of incorporation. Additionally, the ways in which this special clas-
sification would fit within existing stock exchange rules could be ex-
amined. Ultimately, the use of SI shares would likely raise the level of
debate within corporations about social justice issues and increase the
relevance of corporate social responsibility programs.
B. THE SHIFT AWAY FROM BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
Some observers would argue that the use of benefit corporations is a
more appropriate way to combine profit and social justice objectives.
Benefit corporations are a hybrid corporate entity requiring pursuit of a
247. See supra Part III.C.
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“general public benefit” in addition to profit.248 Over twenty-five states
have passed statutes allowing benefit corporations.249 These statutes “ex-
pressly require the consideration of various non-shareholder stakehold-
ers,” unlike traditional corporation statutes simply allowing consideration
of other stakeholders.250
There are certainly advantages to the use of benefit corporations. In-
vestors may choose benefit corporations over other types of entities to
ensure their funds are used in alignment with their social justice values.251
Directors are legally protected when using corporate funds to achieve so-
cially responsible goals.252 Additionally, there has been a great deal of
public attention given to this new type of corporate entity.253
However, benefit corporations are not necessarily the best route for
corporate social responsibility advocates. First, benefit corporations are
new legal entities, and much of the law related to these hybrid businesses
is uncertain.254 Also, their existence may give traditional corporations an
“out” when dealing with social justice advocates: “If you want to invest
for social change, go find a benefit corporation.” Moreover, there are
very few benefit corporations nationally,255 and they tend to be smaller
and less stable companies.256 In Delaware, for example, 74% of public
benefit corporations created from August-October 2013 were new busi-
nesses, raising “questions about the likelihood of their long term per-
formance and success.”257
Following Hobby Lobby, owners of traditional corporations are al-
lowed to consider other stakeholders and other issues beyond share-
holder profits.258 Indeed, “[t]here is no necessary reason why a
corporation cannot usefully advance a public benefit without also requir-
ing the board to consider a range of individual stakeholders.”259 Since
corporations no longer need to prioritize shareholder wealth, the social
responsibility debate should move away from specialized hybrid corpora-
tions and into the boardrooms of larger and more influential
corporations.
Large corporations, especially publicly traded corporations, have enor-
248. Murray, supra note 24, at 23.
249. State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORPORATION INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited July 10, 2014).
250. Murray, supra note 24, at 22.
251. Doug Bend & Alex King, Why Consider a Benefit Corporation?, FORBES (May 30,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/05/30/why-consider-a-benefit-corporation/.
252. Id.
253. Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps.
25 REGENT U.L. REV. 269, 269 (2013).
254. Id.
255. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s
Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 2, 3 (2014).
256. Id. at 15.
257. Id. at 15-16.
258. See supra Part III, A-B.
259. Johnson, supra note 253, at 291.
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mous political clout in the U.S. and in foreign countries.260 Indeed, “large
global corporations . . . have their own nationality and can create their
own . . . policy.”261 Shareholders seeking to create real social change can
have major impacts if they convince large traditional corporations to em-
brace reform. ICCR’s success with ADM is an example of shareholders
able to do exactly that.262 Advocating for change in larger corporations,
rather than investing in narrower benefit corporations, would be a more
effective way for social justice advocates to have a practical impact.
VI. CONCLUSION
As active shareholders are increasingly successful in influencing corpo-
rate action, the socially conscious investor movement is gaining momen-
tum. Sister Patricia Daly and her colleagues exemplify the type of socially
conscious investor now using the corporate form to advocate for change.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby paved the way for inves-
tors to argue that their moral beliefs related to social justice should be
passed through to their corporations. After Hobby Lobby, corporations
can be considered moral “persons” who do not need to consider share-
holder wealth maximization as the highest priority. The creation of Social
Investor classifications of stock and the shift away from benefit corpora-
tions represent two ways for social investors to be effective advocates for
change in the post-Hobby Lobby era. We are witnessing the potential
emergence of a new legal chapter in corporate social responsibility: Cor-
porations as tools for good, not evil, and generosity, not greed.
260. HAMILTON, supra note 28, at 504.
261. Frank René López, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Global Economy After
September 11: Profits, Freedom, and Human Rights”, 55 MERCER L. REV. 739, 753-54
(2004).
262. See supra Part III.D.
